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ABSTRACT
This article explores how systemic risk has been governed at the
international level after the ﬁnancial crisis. While macroprudential ideas
have been widely embraced, the policy instruments used to implement
them have typically revolved more narrowly around the monitoring of risk
posed by discrete ‘systemically important’ entities. This operational focus
on individual entities sidelines the more radical implications of
macroprudential theory regarding fallacies of composition, fundamental
uncertainty and the public control of ﬁnance. We explain this tension using
a performative understanding of risk as a socio-technical construction, and
illustrate its underlying dynamics through case studies of systemic risk
governance at the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund). Drawing on oﬃcial reports, consultation
documents and archival sources, we argue that the FSB’s and IMF’s
translations of systemic risk into a measurable and attributable object have
undermined the transformative potential of the macroprudential agenda.
The two cases illustrate how practices of quantiﬁcation can make systemic
risk seemingly more governable but ultimately more elusive.
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Introduction
The global ﬁnancial crisis has reignited debates about the contemporary political and economic
order. While a relative consensus has emerged on the continued pre-eminence of neoliberalism
(Schmidt and Thatcher 2013, Kaya and Herrera 2015), the jury is still out on whether the crisis has
reconﬁgured ﬁnancial governance (Moschella and Tsingou 2013a, Helleiner 2014). In this realm,
macroprudential ideas, which understand risk as a system-level property, have been on the rise.
Proponents of macroprudential policies contend that microprudential supervision alone cannot
guarantee ﬁnancial stability because ‘systemic risk’ cannot be attributed to individual institutions
(Crockett 2000, Clement 2010). Some advocate deeper institutional change to curb the power of
ﬁnance, rather than simply mitigate its negative eﬀects (Turner 2011, Lothian 2012). Macroprudential
theory crystallised in the early 2000s, when economists at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
an international organisation (IO) composed of national central banks, delineated new regulatory
principles. After the crisis, their proposals informed new forms of regulatory thinking inside and
outside the BIS (Baker 2013). Accordingly, recent scholarship has foregrounded the degree of macro-
prudential institutionalisation within individual polities (Goodhart 2015, Baker 2017, p. 4–6, Lombardi
and Moschella 2017, Thiemann 2018).
While implementation has been underway at the domestic level, standards and guidelines for
macroprudential policymaking have continued to be reﬁned at the international level. Against this
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background, this article examines the post-crisis global governance of systemic risk through case
studies of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund).
Because of their mandates and regular reporting to the G20, these two IOs constitute ‘most likely’
actors for providing the systemic outlook on ﬁnancial risk implied by macroprudential theory.
Indeed, in response to the crisis, the G20 (2009, p. 17, 24) entrusted both organisations with
additional surveillance responsibilities under the joint IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise (EWE) and
the G20 Data Gaps Initiative.
However, we argue that despite an increasing deployment of macroprudential terminology, the
FSB and the IMF have operationalised systemic risk narrowly – that is, with little regard for the
broader relationship between ﬁnance and society. This outcome stemmed chieﬂy from their
eﬀorts to quantify systemic risk and identify certain entities – ﬁnancial institutions and markets,
respectively – as discrete loci of this risk. The measurement practices at the FSB and the IMF thus
exacerbate the dearth of ‘social purpose’ in implementations of otherwise progressive macropruden-
tial ideas after the crisis (Baker 2018). Our analysis connects recent work on ﬁnancial regulation with
scholarship on the formative role of IOs in global governance: at a time when what ‘macroprudential’
means has yet to be settled (Haldane 2013), such highly inﬂuential IOs as the FSB and the IMF can
establish dominant interpretations that narrow the scope for ﬁnancial reform.
To develop this argument, we engage with the performativity literature, which originated in econ-
omic sociology, as well as science and technology studies. Performativity generally refers to the
eﬀects that descriptions exert on the social world. Political economy scholarship has employed the
concept to illustrate, among other things, how economic theory helps to institute markets and
sustain their most fundamental operations (MacKenzie and Millo 2003, MacKenzie 2006); how
speciﬁc models legitimise some policies and delegitimise others (Braun 2014, 2016, Lockwood
2015, Heimberger and Kapeller 2017); and how ﬁnancial crises are bred through valuation practices
and rendered temporarily solvable through targeted but measured interventions (Langley 2010,
2015, Stellinga and Mügge 2017). Following Michel Callon (1998, p. 4), we take seriously ‘[t]he
material reality of calculation’, which suggests that social constructions interact with technical infra-
structures. Discursive practices are insuﬃcient to constitute risks as stable and, therefore, governable
targets. A performativity lens complements constructivist accounts by underscoring how emerging
macroprudential ideas have been tamed by microprudential risk measurement practices. If we
looked solely at the discourses through which such ideas have been articulated in the two organis-
ations after the crisis, we would be likely to overestimate the degree to which their practices have
changed.
The article is organised into three sections. We ﬁrst introduce a performative understanding of risk
to clarify how the quantiﬁcation of systemic risk conditions international regulatory standards, even
while more progressive macroprudential ideas are espoused. We illustrate this dynamic in the second
and third sections, which examine, respectively, the governance of systemic risk at the FSB and the
IMF. Our analysis of oﬃcial reports, consultation documents and archival sources reveals that the
organisations’ surveillance regimes are premised on a conception of systemic risk as a property of
discrete entities. This entities-based approach focuses on risk concentrations in large ﬁnancial insti-
tutions or sectors, which reproduces microprudential practices, albeit under the label of ‘systemic
risk’. Despite displaying openness to the macroprudential agenda, the FSB and the IMF have con-
tained its transformative political potential through the conversion of systemic risk into something
that is measurable and attributable. But because tensions, paradoxes and contingencies in this
approach persist, we conclude that alternative visions of macroprudential politics can be recovered.
The Quantiﬁcation of Systemic Risk
The global ﬁnancial crisis has once more drawn attention to the impact of formative events on the
salience of political ideas and the design of political institutions (Moschella 2010, Broome et al.
2012, Blyth 2013, Widmaier 2016). Social constructivists have been at the forefront of these
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debates, stressing how new and old sets of ideas have clashed. Depending on the framing skills of
leading political actors, constructions of an event as a ‘crisis’ can upend or entrench the status
quo (Boin et al. 2009). At the current juncture, neoliberal policies still muster considerable political
support (Mirowski 2013, Gamble 2014, Matthijs 2016), although ‘bigger and deeper transformations’
may still materialise from ‘incremental changes’ (Moschella and Tsingou 2013b, p. 3). One such long-
term transformation could, for instance, originate from the recent electoral successes of a variety of
communitarian movements with nationalist aspirations in many liberal democracies.
Much constructivist scholarship seeks to understand how ideas are channelled through sticky cog-
nitive ‘ﬁlters’, especially after a crisis. These ﬁlters help actors to sort and interpret relevant infor-
mation based on shared social norms (Abdelal et al. 2010, p. 10–1). This view proﬀers ‘a
cognitively routed kind of explanation that makes claims about how people interpret their situation’
(Abdelal et al. 2010, p. 17). Without cognitive ﬁlters and institutional sensemaking practices, actors
would fail to establish the meanings of materially new situations and to choose a corresponding
behavioural path (Widmaier et al. 2007, p. 748). Constructivist IO scholars have mostly followed in
these tracks by emphasising the capacity of international bureaucracies to disseminate and
amplify inﬂuential ideas (for example, Park 2006, Broome and Seabrooke 2012, Béland and Orenstein
2013). According to this view, it is intersubjective agreement on meanings that gives a concept, such
as systemic risk, its factual status and mediates its reception after a formative event. Constructivist
accounts can be enriched through a performative understanding of systemic risk governance. At
the most general level, social constructivists and performativity theorists share a discomfort with
the rationalist casting of social reality as singular and objectively observable. Fundamentally, they
agree that deﬁning, measuring and regulating risk is never a process of pure discovery. Both
groups instead see risk as a function of the social and material practices put in place to regulate it
(de Goede 2004, p. 205, 2005, p. 81–4, Millo and MacKenzie 2009, p. 639, Best 2010, p. 35–6, Lock-
wood 2015, p. 730, Stellinga and Mügge 2017). Beyond this shared opposition to rationalism,
however, social constructivist and performativity perspectives diﬀer in notable ways.
While prevailing macroprudential discourses have been characterised by intellectual openness
and political ambition, we show that the operational implementation in the FSB and the IMF has
unfolded in much narrower terms. If only systemic risk is measured accurately, the underlying reason-
ing goes, it can be managed by regulators wielding adequate tools. But as research on the inﬂuence
of material infrastructures suggests, certain objects can induce certain behavioural patterns (Latour
1992, Clegg et al. 2013, Austin 2017). Both organisations understand systemic risk as a quantiﬁable
threat to the global ﬁnancial system posed by entities that are deemed ‘too big’ or ‘too intercon-
nected’ to fail. Their instruments deﬁne who or what is ‘risky’ in the ﬁrst place, and how risky in com-
parison. Once that risk is measurable, it also becomes governable for the FSB and the IMF.
In this respect, systemic risk shares an important feature with the concepts and models that it
came to challenge. While the containment of systemic risk had long been part and parcel of neolib-
eral governance techniques (Konings 2016), macroprudential ideas advanced swiftly and spread
widely after the crisis, accompanied by elite discourses invoking ﬁnancial market ‘complexity’
(Baker 2013, Datz 2013). Macroprudential ideas were formulated as corrections to the eﬃcient
market hypothesis and Value at Risk (VaR) models, on which the microprudential thrust of pre-
crisis regulation had rested (Baker 2013, p. 116–7). Just as VaR models had brought into being
certain types of ﬁnancial markets, which justiﬁed new types of regulatory interventions (Lockwood
2015), measurements of systemic risk reconceptualised ﬁnancial institutions and markets in a particu-
lar manner. As a result, new, though not necessarily more progressive, means to govern ﬁnance,
especially regarding the scale of systemic risk, emerged as legitimate. Attempts to conform to chan-
ging norms even spurred largely symbolic institutional reforms in some of the world’s largest ﬁnancial
markets (Lombardi and Moschella 2017).
From a macroprudential perspective, systemic risk is what emerges from a growing interconnect-
edness between ﬁnancial institutions and markets. This view complicates widespread notions of
where risk is located because banks or ﬁnancial markets are not containers of risk but nodes in a
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network of intersecting ties. Systemic risk constitutes less a property of certain institutions than a rela-
tional product; put diﬀerently, such risk travels through the ties, rather than residing in the nodes
(Haldane 2009, p. 12). In their eﬀorts to govern systemic risk, both the FSB and the IMF have sought
to operationalise it through quantiﬁcation. Many IOs design and diﬀuse various quantitative tools
for evaluation, which oﬀer (potentially misleading) informational shortcuts to governance action
(Berten and Leisering 2017, Broome et al. 2018). In addition to representing it, metrics mould the
social world as they sanction particular conceptualisations that, in turn, shape actors’ behaviour (Espe-
land and Stevens 2008, p. 412–6, Hansen and Porter 2012). In contemporary global governance, risk has
come tobeunderstood as something that canbe expressed in seemingly objective numbers, signalling
growing trust in the calculability of the future (Hansen and Porter 2012, p. 416).
The FSB and the IMF ‘enact’ (see Mol 2002, p. vii) systemic risk in similar, though distinct, ways. As
we show below, the most striking commonality is that both organisations render systemic risk mea-
surable under an entities-based framework. The selected indicators quantify the level of systemic risk
embodied by a particular entity, whether a ﬁnancial institution (in the FSB’s case) or a national
ﬁnancial market (in the IMF’s case). An entity is considered ‘risky’ only if it meets the criteria used
to determine risk levels; if its risk score is high, it counts as particularly risky. These surveillance
regimes perform systemic risk as existing in the entities, not the anonymised system of global
ﬁnance with its many ‘intangible assets’ (Bryan et al. 2017). This operationalisation, which is con-
ditioned by material and technical considerations, has pushed each organisation towards a less hol-
istic view of systemic risk than organisational discourses would suggest. Paradoxically, even though
the organisations pride themselves on their capacity and mandate for global, system-wide surveil-
lance (for example, IMF Archives 2013c, p. 37–8, FSB 2018a, 2018b), they ultimately operationalise sys-
temic risk as a property of discrete entities. In sum, these entities are held to be the risk bearers as a
function of their relationship to the global ﬁnancial system, which itself appears risk-free. To better
understand these dynamics, analysis needs to move beyond the discursive and ideational dynamics
stressed in constructivist accounts.
The long-term success of enactments of systemic risk remains highly contingent. A number of ten-
sions have emerged in the FSB’s and IMF’s quantiﬁed performances of systemic risk. These tensions
resemble what Michel Callon (2010) calls the ‘misﬁres’ of performative action. Misﬁres can arise when
the success of a performance depends on conditions that cannot be easily controlled by whoever
carries it out, as is typical of attempts to ascertain the constitutive elements of the ‘economy’
(Callon 2010, p. 165). The macroprudential agenda raises the related question of who or what is
risky, and to whom – that is, who or what meets a particular deﬁnition of ‘systemic risk’. Speciﬁcally,
eﬀorts to govern systemic risk at the international level encounter a fundamental tension in the
global governance architecture. While macroprudential theory emphasises the importance of moni-
toring risks across the ﬁnancial system, the very organisation of the FSB and the IMF into members
that enjoy rights and face duties as nation states thwarts this task. In contemporary economies, many
activities pass through highly complex and integrated ﬁnancial markets so that risky activities can
take place anywhere and anytime. Under conditions of ﬁnancialisation, systemic risk is diﬃcult to
locate in a ﬁxed set of entities, which calls into question the viability of entity-based performances.
To foreshadow the claims developed below, the FSB and the IMF have enacted the concept of
‘systemic risk’, which is central to macroprudential theory, as entailing a microprudential concern
with ‘systemically important’ entities. Such operationalisations of systemic risk as a feature of distinct
entity classes can inspire unwarranted optimism about the long-term stability of ﬁnancial markets. As
Avinash Persaud (2010) warns, a regulatory focus on ‘too big to fail’ entities in non-crisis times
obscures the potential magnitude of knock-on eﬀects: ‘In a crisis almost everyone is “too big to
fail”.’ More generally, the occupation with seemingly technical matters, such as developing systemic
risk metrics to identify and regulate certain entities, has also averted genuine political discussion of
the social functions of ﬁnancial markets (Baker 2018, p. 308–9). The next two sections specify how the
FSB and the IMF have embedded macroprudential ideas into their post-crisis international ﬁnancial
surveillance regimes.
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Governing Systemic Risk at the FSB
This section examines the evolution of the macroprudential governance framework at the FSB to
highlight the practical tensions associated with performing systemic risk as the stable focal point
of ﬁnancial surveillance. In response to the ﬁnancial crisis, the G20 replaced the Financial Stability
Forum (FSF), launched in 1999 under the auspices of the BIS, with the FSB (Helleiner 2010), vesting
the latter with a more expansive operating mandate (Moschella 2013). The FSB’s raison d’être is to
advance and help implement the G20 post-crisis ﬁnancial reform agenda (FSB 2017). To assess the
development of its systemic risk regime since the crisis, the case study draws on FSB reports, meth-
odological documents and consultation papers. To outline central areas of controversy over the
extension of the FSB’s systemic risk approach to shadow banking entities, it also analyses 47
public responses to the 2015 consultation process on ‘Non-Bank Non-Insurer Globally-Systemically
Important Financial Institutions’ (NBNI G-SIFIs). The responses came from a range of actors: banks,
industry associations, think tanks and civil society organisations.1
From its very beginnings, the FSB oﬃcially endorsed macroprudential ideas. Indeed, Article 2 of its
Charter lists, as a ﬁrst objective, to ‘assess vulnerabilities aﬀecting the global ﬁnancial system as well
as to identify and review, on a timely and ongoing basis within a macroprudential perspective, the
regulatory, supervisory and related actions needed to address these vulnerabilities… ’ (FSB 2018a,
emphasis added). This orientation reﬂects the FSB’s origins in the BIS, where macroprudential
ideas rose to prominence. Moreover, when macroprudential regulation is discussed in oﬃcial FSB
documentation, it tends to be deﬁned in an expansive and pluralist fashion. The term denotes a
system-wide perspective, implying a fundamental critique of an entities-based perspective on risk
regulation. A 2011 report co-authored with the IMF and the BIS describes macroprudential regulation
along the following lines: ‘[T]he focus is on the ﬁnancial system as a whole (including the interactions
between the ﬁnancial and real sectors) as opposed to individual components (that take the rest of the
system as given)’ (FSB et al. 2011, p. 4). The report also stresses the need to apply macroprudential
instruments holistically by embedding them into ﬁscal and monetary institutions (FSB et al. 2011).
Likewise, the FSB embraces analytical pluralism and institutional learning when discussing macropru-
dential policies within its country reviews (FSB 2013a, 2013b), which suggests considerable openness
to critiques of the eﬃcient market hypothesis underlying pre-crisis regulatory thought.
However, the FSB has delimited its own macroprudential activities in much narrower terms. Two
features of its approach stand out. First, the FSB mobilises deﬁnitions of macroprudential regulation
that frame it around ‘systemic risk’, a concept much more amenable to quantiﬁcation than ‘uncer-
tainty’ (Haldane 2009, p. 8–9, see also Knight 1964). For example, guidance published together
with the IMF and the BIS states the curtailment of systemic risk as the core objective of macropruden-
tial policy (IMF et al. 2016, p. 4). This view marks a signiﬁcant departure from macroprudential think-
ing concerned with the uncertain, emergent properties of complex ﬁnancial relationships (Haldane
2009). While some degree of Knightian uncertainty is acknowledged in relation to the possibility
of any given ﬁrm failing, the eﬀects of this failure can be calculated and predicted (BCBS 2013,
p. 5, FSB and IOSCO 2015, p. 10). The FSB’s regulatory competence in this area is hence grounded
in the quantiﬁcation of systemic risk.
Second, the management of systemic risk is achieved through the identiﬁcation of a list of discrete
entities – ‘systemically important ﬁnancial institutions’ – where this measurable risk is concentrated.
Following a call from G20 leaders at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, the FSB’s macroprudential agenda
was framed in terms of restoring market discipline in the face of pervasive moral hazards from antici-
pated bailouts with taxpayers’money (FSB 2011, p. 1, 2013c, p. 2). In November 2010, the FSB devised
a framework for systemic risk management as the regulation of SIFIs, which now forms one of its six
policy pillars. Its macroprudential governance thus revolves around the identiﬁcation and surveillance
of SIFIs, held to be the primary loci of systemic risk. These ﬁrms are singled out for stricter national
capital requirements and scenario planning (FSB 2010b, see also BCBS 2013). The SIFI framework sup-
presses alternative visions of macroprudential regulation, which underline the social merits of public
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regulation of ﬁnancial activities, as well as the possibility of political limits to ﬁnancialisation. In short,
with the regulatory focus placed on speciﬁc ﬁrms, the SIFI framework fails to enact more progressive
visions for macroprudential policymaking.
The gap between an ideational commitment to expansive conceptions of macroprudential regu-
lation and more limited measurement choices clariﬁes that systemic risk cannot exist outside of the
practices that make it knowable. Regulators’ preference for small steps over big bangs can in part be
explained with their recognition of the performative qualities of ﬁnancial markets (Stellinga and
Mügge 2017). The performativity of systemic risk has discursive and material facets through which
various actors interpret regulatory designations and decisions as signals about potential future
yields. Through talk and measurement, the FSB seeks to enact systemic risk as a stable property of
diverse ﬁnancial institutions operating in a vast array of heterogeneous and ever-evolving markets
around the world. Its performative dilemma derives from a need for ‘methodologies… to be appli-
cable to a wide range of NBNI ﬁnancial entities that often have very diﬀerent legal forms, business
models and risk proﬁles…while maintaining a certain degree of consistency across the entire
NBNI ﬁnancial space’ (FSB and IOSCO 2015, p. 6).
As an IO, however, the FSB lacks the technical and legal infrastructure to access granular reporting
data on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial activities. It instead relies on data transmission from reporting systems of
national supervisors to a ‘data hub’ at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS 2013,
p. 7, 11). Furthermore, it cannot conduct more context-sensitive qualitative assessments, which are
the preserve of national regulators. As one document explains, a fundamental problem for inter-
national systemic risk monitoring is ‘obtaining appropriate and consistent data/information [across
jurisdictions]’ (FSB and IOSCO 2015, p. 6). Finally, the FSB works under legal constraints, as the trans-
mission of sensible data to it abides by ‘conﬁdentiality regimes that prevent their use for global sys-
temic risk assessment’ (FSB and IOSCO 2015, p. 7).
The FSB’s approach to carrying out systemic risk surveillance is shaped by these practical and tech-
nical constraints. In particular, they aﬀect the selection of an entity-level assessment of risks, the SIFI
approach, and the speciﬁc indicators chosen for assessing these entities. If, by contrast, systemic risk
were understood more holistically as a property that inhered in diverse ﬁnancial activities or instru-
ments, then systemic risk would potentially be located anywhere and everywhere. Such a perspective
would necessitate surveillance of the whole ﬁnancial system, including small and emerging subsec-
tors, which the FSB largely neglects. But overlooking the system in its entirety would undermine the
FSB’s ability to perform systemic risk as a stable object. Moreover, the metrics used to identify and
isolate these entities must be visible in aggregated data accessible to the FSB (see, for example,
BCBS 2013). The two conceptual evolutions discussed above – the re-deﬁnition of macroprudential
regulation as systemic risk management and of systemic risk as a property of individual SIFIs – under-
pin a surveillance regime based on aggregated metrics relating to their ‘size’, ‘interconnectedness’
and ‘complexity’ (BCBS 2013).
This deﬁnition of ‘systemic risk’ renders the monitoring of idiosyncratic risks emerging from
speciﬁc ﬁnancial instruments or relationships within ﬁrms obsolete. It can, therefore, be isolated as
a property held within several large, globally connected entities (FSB 2011). The FSB itself makes
the practical imperatives explicit: ‘A materiality threshold will provide an initial ﬁlter of the NBNI
ﬁnancial universe and limit the pool of ﬁrms… such a threshold is relevant for reducing the size
of the NBNI G-SIFI assessment pool to a practical and manageable number’ (FSB and IOSCO 2015,
p. 10, emphasis added). The FSB’s SIFI framework thus holds systemic risk together as a property
that can be isolated within ﬁnancial entities of a certain size, using measurements of the aggregate
properties of those entities. This framework is a prime example of how the infrastructural, practical
demands of performing systemic risk as a governable object have served to tame this potentially
transformative idea. Apparently prosaic technical constraints under which the FSB works condition
its work in macroprudential governance, exempliﬁed in a narrow entities-based approach to quanti-
fying systemic risk.
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Performative misﬁres have been evident in the controversies over the FSB’s recent attempts to
broaden the SIFI regime to shadow banking ﬁrms, extending the annually updated list of SIFIs to
include insurers, investment funds, asset managers and other institutions (see FSB 2013c). As the indi-
cator framework has been widened, private market actors and even civil society organisations have
increasingly contested its meaning and applicability. In particular, there is growing opposition to the
FSB’s formulation of universal criteria for SIFIs in diverse institutional contexts. To retain the notion of
systemic risk as a stable property, the FSB promotes a ﬁxed set of factors, in principle applicable to
any entity. The FSB consultation document stresses the correspondence of the central criteria across
the ﬁnancial system as a guiding principle for a coherent systemic risk governance regime (FSB and
IOSCO 2015, p. 3). However, the FSB has faced considerable challenges in establishing these factors as
universally valid and portable across contexts.
Eﬀorts to extend the SIFI regime to investment funds in 2015 illustrate this tension. Apparently a
technical indicator of systemic risk, ‘size’ became a major bone of contention between the FSB and
the ﬁnancial entities subject to its surveillance criteria. Speciﬁcally, the FSB proposed an ‘Assets under
Management’ (AuM) indicator for the size and ‘systemic importance’ of investment funds, but ﬁrms
and industry associations contested the use of AuM and balance sheet assets as indicators of systemic
risk. Because hedge funds often increase their market exposure through leverage, the second size
criterion – gross notional exposure (GNE) – quantiﬁes an entity’s ‘market footprint’ (FSB and IOSCO
2015, p. 39). The addition of this indicator is vital to the successful performance of the speciﬁc
problem that the SIFI regime was developed to solve in the ﬁrst place. As explained in the consul-
tation document: ‘ … the larger the GNE, the larger the potential impact to the system’ (FSB and
IOSCO 2015, p. 39). To the extent that size is found to not systemically correlate with risk, the
FSB’s wider enactment of systemic risk is destabilised.
In their consultation responses, ﬁrms argued that size was inappropriate to apply to investment
funds because it focused undue attention on those funds that operated in the largest and most
liquid markets. Larger entities could be seen as posing lower, not higher, levels of systemic risk.
This position is exempliﬁed in the response of Fidelity Investments (2015, p. 38): ‘ … size is not indica-
tive of systemic risk in asset management. To the contrary, larger asset managers tend to be more
resilient.’ In a response representative of the views articulated by many other ﬁrms and industry
bodies, the Paciﬁc Investment Management Company (PIMCO 2015, p. 15) further stated: ‘The
$100 billion materiality threshold is arbitrary and says little about the riskiness of a fund.’ Firms main-
tained that the concept of size was meaningful only in relation to a speciﬁc market. Following this
view while retaining systemic risk as a stable object of macroprudential oversight would require a
complex system for benchmarking and deﬁning asset classes, with asset-speciﬁc size thresholds
developed for each. In turn, the FSB’s ability to enact systemic risk as a universal property of large
ﬁnancial entities vis-à-vis a unitary and singular ‘ﬁnancial system’ would be undermined.
To maintain consistency in the monitoring of banks and non-banks, the FSB has extended its enti-
ties-based logic to shadow banking and now faces a similar problem. Contesting this move, ﬁrms
tended to advocate a process-based understanding of risk. Vanguard (2015, p. 2), for example, com-
plained: ‘Entity-based designations that are driven by size will also never be capable of keeping up
with potentially risky ﬁnancial innovation in the markets, which can emerge from entities of any size,
and will thereby miss the opportunity to accurately and adequately capture risk.’ The European Fund
and Asset Management Association (EFAMA 2015, p. 5) similarly argued for ‘a more holistic and sen-
sible approach to the identiﬁcation and estimation of ﬁnancial market risks arising out of ﬁve key
economic “functions” or activities, instead of focussing on individual entities’. Numerous ﬁrms
raised such concerns during the consultation period. The FSB rejected an activities-based under-
standing of systemic risk, citing consistency and practicality as the main reasons.
The controversy over the FSB’s measurement practices surrounding SIFIs and shadow banks
exemplify some of the practical diﬃculties in enacting systemic risk encountered by an international
regulatory body. This case study highlights how the very ability to perform systemic risk as a property
of distinct entities is undermined by the need to decide where the ﬁnancial system ‘stops’. In this
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sense, it represents a test case for showing how disputes at the margins of this emerging monitoring
regime have served to destabilise the wider ediﬁce of the global governance of systemic risk. In quan-
tifying this risk, the FSB located it in supposedly separable elements of the system, rather than the
system itself. Not only does its approach put entities back at the centre of regulatory attention,
but it also performs the global ﬁnancial system and the risks posed to them as fairly static, which
goes against the tenets of macroprudential theory. Partly as a consequence of these performative
misﬁres, the future of the SIFI regime beyond the banking sector remains in doubt (FSB 2015). As
Andrew Barry (2002, p. 274) insists, metrological standards that are routinely deployed for ‘restricting
political controversy’ contribute to the ‘opening up of new objects and sites of disagreement’. To
demonstrate that narrow enactments and performative tensions were not unique to the FSB, the
next section explores similar dynamics at the IMF.
Governing Systemic Risk at the IMF
The IMF’s macroprudential ambition manifested itself in revisions to its established Financial
Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP). An extension to the FSAP in 2010 stipulated regular ‘man-
datory’ assessments for members with ‘systemically important’ ﬁnancial sectors. The reform’s prin-
cipal purpose was to better link the FSAP – a ﬁnancial sector surveillance exercise conducted in
tandem with the World Bank since 1999 – to IMF surveillance under Article IV (IMF Archives
2010a). The reform applied the idea of systemic risk to entire national ﬁnancial sectors, where
macroprudential policies are implemented. In pursuing this reform, the IMF responded to both
a pledge previously made at the level of the FSB (2010a, p. 1) and growing internal dissatisfaction
with its surveillance track record (IEO 2011). Based on publicly available IMF documents, including
staﬀ papers and Executive Board Minutes available through the online Archives Catalog, this
section contends that the incorporation of macroprudential ideas into FSAP operations was con-
strained by microprudential logics of risk identiﬁcation and quantiﬁcation. The IMF operationa-
lised systemic risk as concentrated in certain national ﬁnancial sectors. While over the long run
the organisational culture has moderated change in IMF surveillance (Moschella 2012), in the
post-crisis period practices of risk measurement in the FSAP have also reined in more progressive
macroprudential visions.
Beyond the principles established together with the BIS and the FSB, the IMF has developed its
own macroprudential approach. Eschewing broader macroprudential questions about ﬁnancialisa-
tion and global ﬁnancial integration, work by IMF staﬀ has centred on operationalising systemic
risk and overcoming the associated challenges of measurement. The IMF’s commitment to system-
level thinking was initially rather qualiﬁed: a 2009 staﬀ paper contained three mentions of a ‘macro-
prudential approach’ (IMF 2009, p. 1, 8 (bold emphasis), 9), all of which had been redacted by the time
it was released by the IMF Archives (2009).
However, the term ‘macroprudential’ has become increasingly prominent in oﬃcial documents
over the years, albeit with contradictory connotations. A telling example in this regard is a 2011 staﬀ
paper, entitled ‘Macroprudential policy—an organizing framework’, which recognises the uncertain-
ties deriving from ‘the nature of ﬁnancial crises [which] limits the ability of statistical tools to predict
them’ (IMF Archives 2011, p. 13). The paper also suggests that systemic risk cannot always be attrib-
uted to particular classes of entities: ‘The monitoring of systemic risks by macroprudential policy
should be comprehensive. It should cover all potential sources of such risk no matter where they
reside’ (IMF Archives 2011, p. 4). Yet the same paper goes on to elaborate risk indicators that
would allow national authorities to pinpoint risk locations and measure risk volumes, as well as insti-
tutional arrangements that would facilitate macroprudential policymaking. Subsequent reﬂections
by both the staﬀ and Executive Directors were devoted to similar issues (IMF Archives 2013a,
2013c). Although the IMF claims for itself the role of ‘a global macroprudential facilitator’ (IMF
Archives 2013c, p. 38, bold emphasis removed), its operationalisation of systemic risk eclipses reﬂec-
tions on how ﬁnancialisation could be curtailed, rather than just managed. This narrow view already
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surfaced in the organisation’s earlier occupation with ‘macroprudential’ ﬁnancial soundness indi-
cators (IMF 2000, p. 3–10).
Macroprudential thinking about systemic risk in the IMF then coexists uneasily with the continued
fragmentation of the global ﬁnancial system into national spheres. The revamped FSAP still operates
along these traditional lines: countries with ﬁnancial sectors deemed ‘systemically important’ ought
to undergo an assessment once every ﬁve years, while participation remains voluntary for all other
members (and independent of their Article IV obligations). IMF staﬀ had initially advocated a
three-year assessment cycle, but the majority of Executive Directors resolved not to endorse this
more intrusive and costlier option (IMF Archives 2010c). The FSAP framework – in both its 2010 orig-
inal version and a 2013 revision – focuses on quantifying systemic risk posed by national ﬁnancial
sectors. At the heart of the extended FSAP lies an aggregate variant of the ‘too big and intercon-
nected to fail’ problem: like the FSB, the IMF thinking is in terms of entities – here national
ﬁnancial sectors instead of individual ﬁnancial institutions – that must not fail because of their size
and their links to each other.
Its measurement practices leave the IMF wedded to more conventional thinking. Systemic risk is
construed as concentrated in twenty-nine (twenty-ﬁve until 2013) jurisdictions classiﬁed as ‘systemi-
cally important’ according to an adaptable risk metric.2 In 2013, the IMF began to employ a clique
percolation method to better gauge the interconnectedness of ﬁnancial sectors (IMF Archives
2013d, p. 14–6). Assessments continue to treat national ﬁnancial sectors as discrete entities, con-
nected in four quantitatively determined, intersecting networks (in banking, debt, equity and price
correlations). On an ad-hoc basis, the IMF also conducts ‘regional’ FSAPs for border-spanning cur-
rency unions. Nevertheless, it has no mandate (and arguably insuﬃcient resources) to simultaneously
assess multiple members that are connected not through institutionalised regional integration but
through more erratic ﬁnancial practices.
A genuinely macroprudential perspective would transcend an entities-based approach in favour
of the more holistic view that risk can occur anywhere in the global ﬁnancial system, not just in
certain nationally regulated ﬁnancial markets. However, the choice of an analytical instrument per-
forms the social world in certain ways, rendering some dimensions more real than others (Law
2009). Despite acknowledging ‘the fact that the systemic importance of a jurisdiction is a global prop-
erty of the network’ (IMF Archives 2013d, p. 15, emphasis added), the IMF prescribes mandatory
FSAPs for only twenty-nine of its members. The FSAP performs systemic risk as being posed by
some ﬁnancial sectors occupying central network positions, rather than by the global ﬁnancial
system in its entirety. This stance becomes abundantly clear in Appendix I to the 2013 staﬀ paper,
in which IMF staﬀ justify the choice of minimum values for the size of the four networks. Tinkering
with these values would either lower or raise the number of ‘systemically important’ jurisdictions.
In the most expansive scenario considered, the ‘systemic core’ would have comprised thirty-four jur-
isdictions, with the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Portugal and Saudi Arabia alongside the
eventually included twenty-nine countries (IMF Archives 2013d, p. 32–3). In other words, the meth-
odology and model speciﬁcations make some countries risky, but not others, while disregarding the
inherent riskiness of a globalised ﬁnancial system.
This narrow operationalisation of systemic risk indicates the limits of the Fund’s post-crisis macro-
prudential approach. As an analytical framework and operational instrument through which the IMF
tries to govern such risk, the FSAP exposes tensions and contradictions within its own contingent per-
formances. As Executive Board proceedings demonstrate, while most Directors rejected the proposal
of a higher assessment frequency, relatively few objected to the basic rationale for classifying
countries when the metric was proposed and, again, when it was reviewed (IMF Archives 2010c,
2013b).3 On this count, the dynamics diﬀer somewhat from those observed for the establishment
of the FSB’s regime.
Yet like the FSB’s performances, the IMF’s attempts to measure systemic risk and isolate it within
‘risky’ entities can misﬁre. Paradoxically, the surveillance regime built around mandatory FSAPs can
reinforce the very problem that it was designed to address: the formation of ﬁnancial sectors that
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are too big and too interconnected to fail. By drawing a line between ‘systemically important’ – that is,
‘risky’ – ﬁnancial sectors and those that are not, the IMF helps to keep the former big and intercon-
nected. These closely monitored sectors cannot be allowed to fail, both because a failure of any such
sector would send a particularly worrying signal to market actors and because it would question the
eﬀectiveness of IMF surveillance. Although sectors can move onto and from the list, as we discuss
below, the division between ‘risky’ and ‘not risky’ ones leaves the original problem untouched. In
this sense, reliance on a set number of ﬁnancial sectors is self-defeating from a wider macroprudential
perspective.
The classiﬁcation of sectors into these two groups is neither natural nor trivial. Some risk manage-
ment tools derive their functionality less from their precision than from their ability to cope with
organisational challenges (Millo and MacKenzie 2009). As Figure 1 illustrates, the IMF’s enactments
of systemic risk are highly contingent, though not arbitrary, involving choices of measurement meth-
odologies and data sets. The interplay of a particular methodology with particular data makes certain
risks real and others unreal. These dynamics surfaced in the shift from the original (2010) to the
revised (2013) methodology for establishing the ‘systemic importance’ of ﬁnancial sectors. Risk enact-
ments produce what may be referred to as ‘additions’, ‘removals’ and ‘close calls’.4 An addition
describes instances where a jurisdiction was excluded from the original list, but is subsequently
included after a review; four additions were made in 2013: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Poland.
A removal denotes instances where a jurisdiction is no longer considered ‘systemically important’;
no removal has occurred since the introduction of mandatory FSAPs in 2010. A close call, ﬁnally,
refers to instances where a jurisdiction would have made or not made it onto the list if a diﬀerent
method or data set had been used. Close calls are far more complicated to detect (because of the
almost inﬁnite possible combinations of methods and data) than additions or removals. Nonetheless,
a review of the known instances of jurisdictions that either narrowly entered or narrowly missed the
list oﬀers some useful insights.
The upper-left hand cell in Figure 1 represents our starting point in 2010, with data from 2008 and
the original methodology: IMF staﬀ calculated the size (weighted by a factor of 0.7) and interconnect-
edness of ﬁnancial sectors within the global banking network (0.3); ranked sectors according to their
composite scores; and selected the two most signiﬁcant clusters (out of three) comprising the ﬁnal
Methodology
Old New
Data
Old 25 jurisdictions
29 jurisdictions
(with Denmark,
Norway, Poland and 
Portugal)
New 24 jurisdictions(without Mexico)
29 jurisdictions
(with Denmark,
Finland, Norway and 
Poland)
Figure 1. The Contingency of Enactments in the IMF’s FSAP. Source: Authors’ overview based on IMF Archives (2013d, p. 19).
Notes: Shaded cells indicate realised enactments: the upper left-hand cell represents the status from 2010 to 2013, the lower right-hand cell the status
since 2013.
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twenty-ﬁve jurisdictions (IMF Archives 2010b). The lower-right hand cell depicts the situation in 2013
with the addition of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Poland. Their inclusion resulted from the appli-
cation of the new clique percolation method to the new data. Apart from these actual changes, two of
the many potential counterfactual enactments merit closer scrutiny.
One such enactment could have arisen from a combination of the old methodology with the new
data, as presented in the lower-left hand cell. Had the more size-focused methodology been retained,
the list would have shrunk to twenty-four jurisdictions: Mexico would have been ranked outside the
group of ‘systemically important’ ﬁnancial markets, and none would have been added (IMF Archives
2013d, p. 19). The original list could also have excluded Mexico quite easily. According to the 2010
background paper, the country, ranked 25th and quite removed from the centre of the banking
network, was ‘a borderline case’ right from the start (IMF Archives 2010b, p. 12). In the short
history of the mandatory FSAPs, Mexico has thus already been a close call twice.
The other alternative enactment could have arisen from a combination of the new methodology
with the old data. In this scenario, shown in the upper-right hand cell, Portugal would have replaced
Finland as one of the four additions. Moreover, the Danish, Norwegian and Polish ﬁnancial sectors
were categorised as ‘systemically important’ because the new methodology was used. Interestingly,
at the launch of the new FSAP framework in 2010, Denmark (ranked 26th just belowMexico), Portugal
(29th), Poland (32nd), Finland (34th) and Norway (35th) had all been assigned to the eventually
dropped third cluster of ﬁnancial sectors (IMF Archives 2010b, p. 10, 12). Further possibilities are
not even accounted for in Figure 1. For example, in addition to Portugal, the Czech Republic, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia would have entered the ‘systemically important’ group if a
diﬀerent calculation parameter had been applied.
The division between ‘systemically important’ and other ﬁnancial sectors is not merely a technical
matter. It has tangible resource implications. To cover all twenty-nine sectors within the agreed ﬁve-
year cycle, the IMF has to deliver nearly six mandatory FSAPs each year, or one every other month.
The organisation has openly prioritised mandatory over voluntary assessments (IMF Archives 2013d,
p. 7). Already in 2010, staﬀ foresaw ‘a sharp reduction in the Fund’s capacity to deliver FSAP assess-
ments to the rest of the membership on a voluntary basis’ unless ﬁnancial sector surveillance activities
were allocated ‘additional resources’ (IMF Archives 2010a, p. 20). The IMF insists that ‘[s]ystemic impor-
tance is not a binary concept… ’ (IMF Archives 2010a, p. 10, 2010b, p. 3), yet its risk practices create two
sharply, albeit temporarily, demarcated regulatory worlds: one containing a minority of ‘systemically
important’ ﬁnancial sectors, which must be assessed regularly; and another containing the vast
majority of all other ﬁnancial sectors, which will be assessed only if a member volunteers for an
FSAP and organisational resources permit it. Although the border between the two worlds can be
redrawn through methodological revisions or data updates, until the next review no ﬁnancial sector,
even if it underwent rapid change, could be reclassiﬁed.
The IMF’s enactments of systemic risk reverberate beyond budgetary allocations. They matter for
political reasons. The reformed FSAP constitutes national ﬁnancial sectors with certain characteristics
as excessively risky for the global ﬁnancial system and, simultaneously, prescribes mandatory assess-
ments as a remedy. By performing ﬁnancial sectors as distinguishable threats to the global ﬁnancial
system, the IMF downplays the risks posed by that system to countries and the well-being of their
populations. A case in point is Iceland, whose excessively large ﬁnancial sector was among the
most spectacular to tumble despite regular IMF surveillance under Article IV and the FSAP prior to
the ﬁnancial crisis (IEO 2011, p. 15). If FSAPs serve as vehicles for organisational learning (Seabrooke
2012), staﬀ, as well as the private sector professionals that are increasingly recruited as consultants for
FSAP missions (Seabrooke and Nilsson 2015), learn to conceive of systemic risk in this unidirectional
fashion. Similarly, Executive Directors, including those critical of mandatory assessments, often worry
more about whether the ‘right’ countries are covered than about how global ﬁnancial integration
impinges on all members (IMF Archives 2010c, 2013b). This opposite direction of causality tends
to elude quantiﬁcation as long as data are collected primarily about – and with the help of –
member states. From such a perspective, a national ﬁnancial sector is less at risk than it is a risk.
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 11
Conclusion
The global governance of systemic risk continues to concentrate on single entities – be they
ﬁnancial institutions or national ﬁnancial sectors. In this article, we have argued that the FSB
and the IMF have translated their commitment to the macroprudential agenda into metrics
that validate microprudential understandings of systemic risk. These enactments are predicated
upon, in the FSB’s case, the identiﬁcation of, and agreement on, metrics for the ‘size’ of the
‘market’ in which ﬁrms operate; and, in the IMF’s case, the creation of two groups of ‘national’
ﬁnancial sectors predeﬁned by the political borders placed around them. Since systemic risk is
made a property of speciﬁc entities, these metrics anonymise and exculpate the global
ﬁnancial system itself, marginalising debates about institutional transformations that would
strengthen public control over ﬁnancialised economies. Our ﬁndings thus have important impli-
cations for how the potential for ﬁnancial reform is envisaged and debated a decade after the
global ﬁnancial crisis.
The analysis points to an understudied paradox of ﬁnancial surveillance (see Baker 2017, p. 7–18)
exercised by international ﬁnancial institutions: The provision of global ﬁnancial stability represents
a ‘common-resource problem’ (Tucker 2016), which should favour the coordination of domestic
regulatory activities by IOs with a system-level perspective on increasingly complex cross-border
ﬁnancial transactions. Individual domestic agencies lack the structure and purview to furnish
global analysis and set universal standards (IMF Archives 2013c, p. 31–5). At the same time,
however, global surveillance demands that diﬀerent contexts be grasped through simpliﬁed
metrics that can travel across jurisdictions, such as measures of size as proxies of systemic risk.
Thus, while the macroprudential agenda seems to require greater system-wide oversight, the tech-
nical and practical demands of performing systemic risk circumscribe its governance. Systemic risk
may prove ungovernable without some measure of regulatory de-fragmentation and politically
induced de-ﬁnancialisation.
The organisations’ renderings of systemic risk nonetheless remain open to counter-performances.
As our case studies have highlighted, FSB and IMF surveillance operations rely on a contingent, albeit
not arbitrary, distinction between presumably risky and presumably safe ﬁnancial sectors. Decisions
about which entities are classiﬁed as ‘risky’ – and which, by implication, are not – cannot be inferred
from inherent features of these entities. Such classiﬁcations are made and remade through various
interventions, including risk discourses and material devices that render some risk types, though
not others, measurable, attributable and governable. Perhaps one of the most powerful eﬀects of
enacting systemic risk as a threat posed by discrete entities to the global ﬁnancial system is the rela-
tive silencing of more far-ranging debates about the desirability of ﬁnancialisation. As in other areas
of global governance, apparently technical measurement choices have practical and political
consequences.
Notes
1. All responses can be found online at: http://www.fsb.org/2015/06/public-responses-to-march-2015-consultative-
document-assessment-methodologies-for-identifying-nbni-g-siﬁs/.
2. These twenty-nine ﬁnancial sectors are (in alphabetical order): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China,
Denmark (added in 2013), Finland (added in 2013), France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
(South) Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway (added in 2013), Poland (added in 2013), Russia,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (IMF Archives
2013d, p. 17, 19).
3. The most notable exception in 2010 was the Executive Director from Brazil, P. Nogueira Batista, who repeat-
edly demanded clariﬁcations on the chosen metric, the underlying calculations and the resulting ranking;
despite support from some colleagues, Batista was in the end the only Director to not approve the
revised staﬀ proposal and abstained instead (IMF Archives 2010c, p. 38–41, 52–3, 59, 65, 70–1, 74, 75–6, 79).
4. The IMF itself uses the ﬁrst two terms or derivations to describe changes to the list and the sensitivity of its own
calculations.
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